Project: Manipulability of voting rules
Ru
Home page
Main Notions
Probabilistic Models
Voting procedures
Indices of manipulability
Multi-valued Choice and
Extended Preferences
Results of voting procedures
Team
References
Properties of voting rules
Degree of Manipulability
Decisiveness
Resoluteness
Freedom of Manipulability
(I
1
: I
1
+
, I
1
0
, I
1
-
)
Efficiency of Manipulability
Compare properties
Manipulability Minimum
Index Extremum
Index vs. Index for Rule
Index vs. Index for Agents
Pareto non-dominated rules
Resoluteness distribution
Sequential Elimination
Sequential Elimination 1
Sequential Elimination 2
Comparison Table
Index vs. Lambda
Coalitional NK Index vs. Agents
Coalitional NK Index vs. Lambda
Index vs. Agents
Decisiveness vs. Agents
Resoluteness vs. Agents
Decisiveness vs. Lambda
Resoluteness vs. Lambda
Index vs. Index for Agents
No Show Paradox
Index vs. Lambda
Index vs. Agents
Experimental
Freedom of Manipulability I
1
Manipulability freedom Maximum I
1
0
Exact Manipulation
Reference Plot
Reference Plot for
Large number of agents
Transition Matrix
Correlation Matrix
Exact vs. Approximate
Large number of agents
Condorcet domains /
"Never" conditions
Individual profile manipulation
Coalitional manipulability
Disclaimer: Please note that this web site is still under developement and some data may be not fully validated or incomplete!
Coalitional Manipulation - Efficiency of Manipulability
Model
Coalitional Manipulation
Individual Manipulation
Index
(info)
I2 (average gain)
I3 (maximum gain)
Culture
(info)
IC
IAC
Alternatives
3
4
5
Extended preferences
(info)
Nothing selected
Max. Number of Agents
Rule categories
Scoring Rules
Majority Relation-Based Rules
Value Function Rules
Tournament Matrix Rules
q-Paretian Rules
Nothing selected
Rules
(info)
Nothing selected
Download CSV
Reset
Copy link
Black & White
Ru
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
No Data
5.00
5.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
