Manipulability of Social Choice Rules

The problem of manipulation in voting is that a voter can achieve a better social decision for herself by misrepresenting her sincere preference.
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) showed that for at least three alternatives and single-valued choice every non-dictatorial voting rule is individually manipulable. Later Duggan and Schwartz (2000) had generalized this result for the case of multiple choice (when there can be more than one alternative as the result of voting).

Then interesting question arises: if we know that every social choice rule is manipulable, how can we find the least manipulable one?
We address this problem using several models of manipulation in single-valued and multiple-valued choice.

This web-portal is the result of the ongoing work conducted at the National Research University Higher School of Economics since 2006.
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The Team

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