Project: Manipulability of voting rules
Ru
Home page
Main Notions
Probabilistic Models
Voting procedures
Indices of manipulability
Multi-valued Choice and
Extended Preferences
Results of voting procedures
Team
References
Properties of voting rules
Degree of Manipulability
Decisiveness
Resoluteness
Freedom of Manipulability
(I
1
: I
1
+
, I
1
0
, I
1
-
)
Efficiency of Manipulability
Compare properties
Manipulability Minimum
Index Extremum
Index vs. Index for Rule
Index vs. Index for Voters
Pareto non-dominated rules
Resoluteness distribution
Sequential Elimination
Sequential Elimination 1
Sequential Elimination 2
Comparison Table
Index vs. Lambda
Coalitional NK Index vs. Agents
Coalitional NK Index vs. Lambda
Index vs. Agents
Decisiveness vs. Agents
Resoluteness vs. Agents
Decisiveness vs. Lambda
Resoluteness vs. Lambda
Index vs. Index for Voters
Experimental
Freedom of Manipulability I
1
Manipulability freedom Maximum I
1
0
Exact Manipulation
Reference Plot
Reference Plot for
Large number of agents
Transition Matrix
Correlation Matrix
Exact vs. Approximate
Large number of agents
Condorcet domains /
"Never" conditions
Individual profile manipulation
Coalitional manipulability
Disclaimer: Please note that this web site is still under developement and some data may be not fully validated or incomplete!
Coalitional manipulability of a profile in a given voting procedure
